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4. Concluding Remarks 44individual (retirement) savings. Across countries, there is u great deal of variation in the
relative importance of these three sources of income as well as in the institutional organization
of each of them. Differences in the organization of the pension systems are one reason behind
the fact that the problems that the pension systems face for the future are more serious in one
country than in the other.
1
Table I summarizes facts over a number of dimensions of the institutional design of old-age
pension systems in 17 OECD-countries. The relative importance of public pension schemes is
to some extent reflected in the level of public pension expenditure relative to GDP, and is
related to the ratio of average pensions to average wages (the implicit replacement rate).
According to these indicators the role of the public sector is particularly prominent in
continental Europe (with the Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark as the exceptions) and
tends to be less pronounced in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
2 The present value of uncovered
future liabilities in the public sector pension system as a percentage of GDP may give an
indication as to the extent to which reforms are necessary. As a measure of the relative weight
of occupational pensions in the overall old-age security system, the percentage of employees
covered can be misleading when occupational pension plans are only designed to provide a
marginal addition to other (public) pensions. This is the case for example in Germany.
Therefore, the importance of occupational pension plans may be better reflected in the value of
accumulated assets measured as a proportion of GDP.-
1
In most industrial countries, a mandatory public pension plan is at the heart of the old-age
security system. Formal arrangements, however, can differ in a number of ways. Pension
schemes may have either redistribution or saving and insurance as dominant objectives. They
1 Of course, the differing degree of population aging is anolher important factor.
2 For Japan and New Zealand the assessment is somewhat unclear because a relatively low share of
GDP spent on public pensions combines with a relatively high implicit replacement rate.
1 Mandatory occupational pension schemes that work (primarily) on a pay-as-you-go basis are included
in the public sector even if private sector institutions are involved in the management of the system.
















































































Recent Reforms of Significance
Introduction of a pattern of mandatory fully funded occupa-
tional pensions (since 1986).
Change of indexation from gross to net wages (1993); reduc-
tion of preferential treatment of public sector employees
(1997).
Increased pre-fundingof the earnings-related scheme through
advanced contribution hikes, improved investment rules,
lower benefits (1997). Revision of the basic scheme (2001).



















































































Recent Reforms of Significance
Extension of coverage of occupational pension schemes
through collective bargaining (early 1990s).
Increase of actuarial fairness, increase in the period of refer-
ence earnings, change in reference index, gradually increased
means-testing on the basic pension (1993-1996).
Change of indexation from gross to net wages (1984) to CPI
(1988), only private sector scheme: increase in the period of
reference earnings, transfer of noncontributory pension rights
to a tax financed ..solidarity fund" (1993).
Change of indexation from gross to net wages; reduction of
benefits for early retirees, gradual increase in the normal re-
tirement age for women (1992); introduction of a demo-
graphic factor into the benefit formula (1999).














































































Recent Reforms of Significance
Suspension of indexation to gross wages (1992); shift towards
a more uniform contribution-based system with improved actu-
arial fairness and an effective reduction in average benefits
(1995). Introduction of tax incentives for individual retire-
ment savings.
Gradual increase of the retirement age to 65 between 2001 to
2018, change of indexation from gross to net wages, increase
of the contribution rate by 2.5 percentage points every 5 years
(1994).
Calculation of benefits in occupational pension schemes on
the basis of lifetime rather than last earnings (underway).
Gradual increase of the statutory retirement age from 60 to 65
(1992-2001).













































































Recent Reforms of Significance
Introduction of private pension funds (1988): increase of the
reference period for earnings, increased actuarial fairness
(1995).
Improved actuarial fairness, increased means-testing of basic
pension, introduction of a growth factor into indexation, in-
creased prefunding through individual accounts (1998).
Funded occupational pensions made mandatory (1985); only
minor changes to public system.
Introduction of personal pensions as an option to contract out
of the public scheme (1987); measures to increase the attrac-
tiveness to opt out (1986, 1995); increase in the statutory
retirement age of women to 65 between 2010-2020.

















































Recent Reforms of Significance
Increased pre-funding through accumulation in a trust fund,
increase of the retirement age to 67 from 2000 onwards
(1983); increased prefunding through individual accounts,
increase of the retirement age to 70 by 2029 (underway).
MTF: means-tested flat benefit; TF: tax financed: CR: contributions-related benefit; CF: contributions financed; UF: universal flat benefit.
Notes:
 aAs of 1995. - ''Implicit replacement rates are calculated as the ratio of average pensions to average wages. -
 cAs of 1994. - ^As of 1993. -
 eNet liabilities are equal to
gross liabilities, because pensions are tax financed. -
 fIn these countries, there is a significant subsidy from the government budget, ranging from around 10 percent of expenditures
in France and the United States to 33 percent in Japan. - SBecause of their pay-as-you-go character in the cases of Finland and France the mandatory occupational pensions are
included in the public pension system. - ^Including personal pensions (25 p.c. points).
Source, World Bank 1994 (Table A6. A7): Chand and Jaeger 1996 (Table 7); OECD 1996b (Table 2.2). 1997 (Table 16); Davis 1996 (Table 1); Thomas 1997 (Table 1);
own compilation.may specify either their benefits in advance (defined-benefit type), or their contributions and
pay benefits according to the return on the contributions (defined-contribution type). They may
be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis (from general tax revenues or from social security
contributions), or on a largely funded basis.
In reality, we find basically two different approaches to public pension schemes. The first is the
social insurance approach which can be found in most continental countries of Western
Europe, in the US, and also in Japan. Here, the working generation is required to contribute to
the system a certain percentage of a relevant income, and benefits are related to contributions
and/or earnings. The countries that have public pension schemes at work according to the
social insurance approach again differ significantly with respect to the arrangements in detail,
for example as concerns the degree of redistribution inherent in the system, the coverage of the
population, and the proportion of retirement income that is supplied by the system. Another
difference concerns funding. While financing is in principle pay-as-you-go across the board, it
works in some countries, like in the US or Japan, effectively on a partially funded basis because
contribution rates have deliberately been set beyond what is needed to finance current pension
expenditure in order to accumulate funds that can be used in the years when the strong cohorts
are to retire.
The other approach to social security dominates in the Anglo-Saxon countries (with the major
exception of the US), and in Scandinavia. Here the public pension was originally designed as a
flat-rate benefit that sets a floor to old-age income and is financed by flat-rate contributions or
general tax revenues. Retirement income exceeding this basic benefit should, in principle, be
provided for privately. Over time, however, an earnings-related part was usually added. This
has led to an increased importance of the public pension schemes for the overall old-age
security system and has reduced the actual difference between the two approaches to some
extent.
As concerns the second important source of retirement income, occupational pensions,
countries differ in a number of aspects, including the arrangement as defined-benefit ordefined-contribution plans, the adjustment for inflation, regulations on investment which have
an effect on risk and return, and relevant rules in the tax code, which make it more or less
attractive for a firm to offer a pension fund. Of particular importance for the outcome in terms
of coverage is that in some countries, namely in Australia, Switzerland and. increasingly.
Denmark, the enrollment in occupational pension schemes is mandatory, while it is voluntary
in the other countries. An additional factor is whether it is possible to contract out of public
earnings-related schemes; this is the case in the UK and in Japan. The relative role of
occupational pensions as a source of retirement income is found to be dependent on the scale
of public pension provision, particularly if there is generous provision for individuals with
higher income levels (Davis 1998). The replacement of a rather high share of earnings through
the public pension system also for medium and high income earners, as is the case for example
in Germany, France or Italy, tends to reduce incentives to provide for additional sources of
retirement income. By contrast, the role for additional pillars is likely to increase, when the
replacement rate of public pensions decreases strongly with rising income so that the pensions
are more like a Hat benefit, which is the case, for example, in the Netherlands or in
Switzerland.
With respect to the third pillar of retirement income, individual voluntary savings, there is a
lack of data which can to some extent be traced to the fact that it is difficult to discriminate
between savings for retirement and other savings. It seems, however, safe to say that the extent
of voluntary retirement savings is negatively influenced by the amount of savings that is
already ..forced" by the arrangements in the first and second pillars.'' Another influence is the
tax treatment of income saved for retirement.
4 Voluntary saving will be affected less when the promised pension benefits implicit in current rules are
not credible.10
Recent Reforms in Industrial Countries^
Recent reforms lo adjust to the pressures of the changing economic and demographic
environment, have essentially proceeded along three routes: (I) redressing the public pension
systems; (2) strengthening the role of funded occupational pension schemes; (3) increasing
incentives for voluntary retirement saving.
In almost every country surveyed there have been reforms of the public pension schemes of
some significance in order to improve the financial prospects of the system. One direction of
reform was reducing the effective level of benefits through a number of measures: The period
of earnings referred to in the calculation of benefits has been increased (Belgium, Finland,
France, Netherlands, Spain). Basic benefits have increasingly been made subject to an income-
test (Canada. Finland, Sweden). Indexation rules have been changed (Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy. Japan, Sweden). In Germany, an additional factor reflecting the increase of
life expectancy of new retirees has been introduced in order to lower the benefits relative to
relevant earnings. As a further measure to contain the rise in pension expenditure the statutory
retirement age will be gradually lifted in a number of countries (Germany, Italy, Japan, New
Zealand, UK, US), and eligibility rules to early retirement have been tightened in most
countries. In addition, sometimes as part of a general tendency to strengthen the link between
contributions and benefits and improve actuarial fairness, steps have been taken to reduce the
attractiveness of early retirement and reward a longer working life. Another direction, which
has been followed by a number of countries is to increase prefunding of future pension
expenditure. In some countries, a gradual increase in the rate of contribution has been
legislated beyond what would have been necessary to immediately balance the system's
finances in order to partially fund future liabilities (US, Japan, Canada). Other countries have
decided to divert a certain share of contributions into funds (Finland, Sweden), which in the
•
s A sketchy overview on reform measures is given in the last column of Table I.II
case of Sweden (and in the future, according to recent plans, also in the US) are personal
accounts.
A second route of reform was to increase the importance of fully-funded, privately managed
occupational pensions. One way to achieve this was to reduce the generosity of public pension
benefits and, hence, reduce the attractiveness of these schemes. But there were also important
changes in the regulations concerning occupational pensions. In several cases occupational
pensions have been made compulsory (Australia, Denmark, Switzerland). Other countries
enable individuals to opt out of part of their social security contributions (UK, Japan). A
further direction was to allow additional types of pension schemes to be operated. Particularly,
there has been a tendency to favor the establishment of defined contribution plans over defined
benefit plans (Australia. Denmark, Switzerland, UK, US) in order to make occupational
pension schemes more attractive, especially for smaller firms, and reduce the problem of
portability.
6 On the investment side, there is a clear tendency to ease restrictions on
investment of funds, which are now recognized to contribute to increasing risk by limiting the
possibility of diversification rather than to foster ,,prudent" investment behavior. Particularly,
the allowed share of equity in the portfolio has been increased, and restrictions on cross-
border investments have been eased in countries such as Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Germany, Japan, and Sweden. External funding of liabilities is becoming increasingly the rule,
with Japan for example reducing the tax benefits to book reserve funding relative to external
funding.
As to the third pillar of retirement income, the tax treatment of retirement savings has been
improved in some countries. Particularly, in Italy and Spain tax incentives have been
introduced only rather recently.
^ Another reason to favor dcfined-conlrihution plans may have been the risk of default that is inherent in
defined-benefit plans.12
More Radical Reforms in Middle Income Countries
While reforms in the industrial countries have been rather gradual in most cases (as will be the
impact of these changes), an increasing number of middle income countries have, in face of a
much more imminent pressure to reform, resorted to a more radical transition towards a multi-
pillar system comprising a major funded element. In Latin America the pioneering example of
Chile was followed in recent years by countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and
Uruguay. Others are engaged in serious discussions. More countries that are about to
implement pension reforms along similar lines can be found in Central and Eastern Europe,
including Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. The experience in these countries leads to
the conclusion thai a! some stage a radical approach to reform may be more feasible than
gradual adjustment. The considerable variation in the details of the pension systems that are to
be established as well as in the details of the transition can partly be explained by country-to-
country differences with respect to objectives, history, and current circumstances, particularly
the relative strengths of redistributive and saving goals, the financial market development, and
the taxing and regulatory capacities (James 1997). However, comparative evaluation of the
pension reforms in these countries can be expected to give further empirical evidence on the
shape of a well-designed pension reform.
Conclusion: Towards Increased Funding
Summing up, there is a clear tendency to reforms that increase the degree of pre-funding of
pension obligations. A number of countries has proceeded significantly along that route, be it
through stronger funding in the public pension schemes (Canada, Finland, Sweden, US), be it
through strengthening the role of private occupational pensions (Australia, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, UK). These measures that tend to lessen the burden on future
generations, have resulted in a burden today that is somewhat higher than without such
reforms despite the fact that measures to restrain expenditure were taken also. In some
countries, contribution rates are raised beyond what would have been necessary without an




increased. To this end, it can be said that the consolidation of the general government finances
(excluding social security) can greatly contribute to the viability of a major switch to funded
pensions. This can be also concluded from the experience of the increasing number of middle-
income countries that have implemented rather wide-sweeping reforms. Another set of
industrial countries have confined their reforms mainly to more or less significant adjustments
to the prevailing pay-as-you-go systems, without increasing the funded clement (Austria.
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain). The capacity of the
conventional measures to redress these systems in order to balance their finances in the long-
term seems limited, however.
2. Pension Systems and Pension Reforms in Industrial Countries
2.1 Australia
The Australian government has introduced a three-pillar system which is very similar to the
World Bank (1994) recommendations (Bateman and Piggott 1997). ll consists of a basic tax
financed state pension (Age Pension) which is means-tested.
7 The pension for an individual is a
flat rate 25 percent of average weekly earnings, and the cost to the federal budget is at the
moment around 3 percent of GDP (Edey 1997: 169). The eligibility age is 65 for men and 60
for women, and the pension is indexed to consumer prices (Rosenman and Warburlon 1996).
Since 1986, there has been gradually introduced a second pillar, an obligatory (since 1992)
private insurance which is fully funded and primarily financed from employer's contributions.
These are scheduled to reach 9 percent of wages in the year 2002. In addition, there are
employee's contributions that will be 3 percent in the year 2000. The contributions are paid
7 Since the Age Pension was introduced in 1909, it was subject to income or properly tests that
changed over time. In the 1970s, the means test was abolished for Ihose over the age of 70. bul
during the 1980s an income lest for all age pensions was reintroduced combined with an asset test
(Knox 1995:107).14
into an individual account which belongs to the employee, and low-wage earner's contributions
are supplemented by the state. The contributions are tax deductible. A third pillar is voluntary
savings or voluntary occupational pension schemes which also have some preferential tax
treatment.
One main reason for the move of the Australian government towards a compulsory
superannuation was the desire for a wider coverage of occupational old-age insurance, as
occupational pension schemes have traditionally been an important source of retirement
income. Since the introduction of the scheme, private sector coverage has risen from around
30 percent to some 90 percent of employees. The transition has been relatively easy as many of
the features of the superannuation industry remains as they were when coverage was
voluntary" and has not been complicated by the existence of a contributory public sector
pension scheme with unfunded liabilities.
One problem with the Australian system is that it produced a substantial uncertainty because,
although it had been established only recently, there have been frequent changes in the
provisions of the system and in the tax treatment of contributions as well as benefits (Knox
1995). An additional problem is the integration of the various pillars in a rational, equitable and
sustainable way. Specifically, the question of means tested or universal basic pension benefits
has in Australia so far been solved in favor of a means test. However, the retirement age of the
compulsory superannuation has not been aligned with the pension age nor is it required to take
the superannuation entitlement in form of a pension. Thus, incentives remain to retire early and
become eligible for the age pension after dissipatation of some of their superannuation benefit.
x Most of the older (voluntary) plans which have been of the defined-benefit type remain in existence
while the newer plans introduced in response to the government requirement are of the
defined-contribution type.15
2.2 Austria
The Austrian old-age pension system resembles closely to the German system It is basically
earnings related and does not provide a minimum pension, although the principle of
contribution equivalency is weakened by various provisions that introduce a rather strong
redistributionary element into the system. One quarter of expenditures is covered by general
tax revenues in order to compensate for expenditures that result from such kind of
redistribution. The financing is pay-as-you-go, and pensions are indexed to net wages although
the increase of consumer prices serves as a bottom limit. The statutory retirement age is at 65
for men and 60 for women.
Austria's public pension payments represent more than 15 percent of GDP which is the highest
number among the industrialized countries (World Bank 1994), mainly because of a relatively
high benefits level; the replacement rate is at 76 percent on average with significantly higher
numbers for some groups of workers (Guger 1998). The rate of contribution paid by
employers and employees (with the exception of civil servants) is 22.8 percent with a
maximum contribution threshold.
The future problems to the system due to the aging of populations are particularly alarming.
One reason is that the demographic developments are slightly more unfavorable than on
average in the OECD-countries. A second problem is that the present burden of the system on
the economy is already relatively large. Necessary to balance the system in the year 2045
would be a contribution rate of more than 35 percent, a reduction of the replacement rate to
below 50 percent, an increase in the retirement age by more than ten years, or a combination of
these. However, a significant reform has not been implemented yet, although the pension
reform of 1993 included the change of indexation from gross to net wages. Recently, there has
been some discussion on further steps to secure the viability of the system, but proposals are
mainly restricted to adjustments within the system (Riirup 1997). Recent further measures
which aimed at reducing the preferential treatment of public sector employees have not been
convincing (Lenhardt 1997). They also include an increase in the number of years used to
calculate the pension from 15 to 18 years in the case of early retirement.16
2.3 Belgium
1'
The Belgian public pension system is on a pay-as-you-go basis. It comprises of four major
schemes, lor civil servants, for wage earners, for the self-employed, and a guaranteed minimum
income scheme. There is a supplementary pillar of occupational pensions which is of limited
significance although some 30 percent of the workforce are covered.; acumulated assets
amount to around 10 percent of GDP (OECD 1994c). Private retirement insurance is available
but has so far been limited in size.
The pension scheme for private sector wage earners is funded through social security
contributions of 16.36 percent of gross income (7.5 percent by the employee another 8.86
percent by the employer) and a government subsidy amounting to around 1 percent of GDP.
The level of pensions paid depends on the salary during the entire career (with an imputed
salary used for spells of illness or unemployment etc.), the length of the career and the marital
status when retired. Pensions are indexed to CPI. While there is a ceiling on earnings used to
calculate the pension, there is no ceiling on contributions. Since the ceiling on pensionable
income is rather low — about 20 percent above the average wage — the tax component of
the social security contributions is rather large. Because the ceiling is indexed to the CPI and
real wage growth is not accounted for, the pension scheme is gradually moving towards a flat
basic pension scheme.
Pensions for public sector employees are paid out of the general government budget.
Retirement age is between 60 and 65. The retirement pension depends on the reference salary,
the career length and the replacement rate which is dependent on the career length, and is
subject to a maximum. There is also a minimum pension differentiated according to household
structure. The pension scheme for the public sector is more generous than the private sector
scheme, one reason being that pensions are effectively indexed to wages rather than CPI.
This seclion draws on Callatay and Turtelboom (1997).17
A minor reform undertaken in 1996 will raise the career length necessary to receive the full
pension benefit for women over the next 15 years from 40 years to 45 years that is already
effective for men. Retirement age at which the full pension can be drawn is between 60 and 65




The Canadian public pension system has two tiers. The first is financed from tax revenues and
is designed to put a floor on old-age income. It consists of a basic universal grant (Old Age
Security. OAS) and income-tested supplements (Guaranteed Income Supplement. CIS. and
Spouse's Allowance, SPA). The benefits are indexed to CP1 and are not taxable. They arc
payable from the age of 65 (from the age of 60 to 65 for widows of OAS pensions in the case
of SPA). The second tier is an earnings-related pension scheme (Canada and Quebec Pension
Plans) financed pay-as-you-go" by compulsory contributions from employers, employees and
self-employed. The contribution rate is presently at 6.1 percent of covered earnings.'- Benefits
replace 25 percent of average lifetime earnings, but combined with the OAS the benefit
schedule is steeply progressive, i.e. the replacement ratio declines strongly with increasing
earnings. Benefits are taxable and indexed to consumer prices. The statutory retirement age is
65, but it is possible to retire as early as 60 with an actuarial reduction of the benefit. In
addition, there are tax incentives to engage in registered private pension plans which arc a
relatively important source of retirement income in Canada. In 1992, 47.5 percent of workers
were covered by occupational pensions (Gruber 1997: 13).
At 5 percent of GDP, public pension expenditure is presently relatively modest in international
comparison, one reason being that public pensions replace a relatively small share of working
age income. But the expenditure ratio has doubled over the recent 25 years, and is projected to
1
0 Before 1991 it was 65 for men and 60 for women, and the pension was reduced by 5 percent I'o
each year of retirement before reaching this statutory retiremenl age.
'' The CPP has in the past accumulated a fund amounting to roughly 7 percent of GDP.
1
2 There is a basic exemption and an upper limit to pensionable earnings.18
rise to over 9 percent of GDP by 2030, partly as a result of a particularly steep rise in the old-
age dependency ratio.
1
3 Although currently the expenditure on the first tier of the public
pension system represents about one half of total outlays, the debate has focused on the second
tier because the increase in expenditure stems mainly from this part of the public pension
system. It is expected that contribution rates will have to triple in the absence of reforms to
keep the Canada Pension Plan in balance.
In order to keep the CPP solvent, an increase in the contribution rate to 7.9 percent in 2005
and to 9.9 percent in 2025 has already been legislated (Kramer and Li 1997: 7), but this will
not be sufficient without further reform. In 1997, a reform proposal was drafted that consisted
of an increased pre-funding through an increase of the contribution rate to 9.9 percent as early
as 2003. Further measures included a revision on regulations of the investment of social
security funds in order to raise the rate of return on these funds, a tightening of eligibility
criteria and lower benefits. The combination of these measures is projected to allow the
contribution rate to be held constant after the year 2003.
Other important changes relate to the first tier benefits (OAS, GIS and SPA). It is envisaged to
replace these benefits through a single Seniors Benefit from the year 2001. The essential
feature of the Seniors Benefit is that it is more targeted than the old system, and at the same
time increases the guaranteed minimum income for pensioners (OECD 1996: I42ff.). As to the
transition, all Canadians age 60 by the end of 1995 can choose either the new Seniors Benefit
or the old system for the rest of their lives (Battle 1996).
1
1 As compared to the contribution rate that had been projected for the year 2030 at the time of the
introduction of the Canada Pension Plan in 1966 (5.5 percent), the difference to the currently
expected 14.5 percent is to only 30 percent demographic developments. Another 25 percent is
attributable to revisions in the underlying macroeconomic assumptions. The remainder can be
attributed to enrichment of benefits and higher disability benefits (OECD 1996c: 126).19
2.5 Denmark
The Danish pension system consists of a tax-financed general basic pension that is paid at the
age of 67 at a flat rate replacing about 38 percent of an average wage (Barnes 1997). The
amount can be supplemented subject to an income test. Adding to the basic old-age pension is
a compulsory national pension scheme (ATP), which is fully-funded and of a defined
contribution type. Contributions are based on hours worked, but are fairly low
14, so that the
share of the ATP-pension in retirement income will be fairly low when the system that has been
established in 1964 first matures in the early years of the next century.
In addition to the public pension schemes, most salaried employees contribute to fully-funded
defined contribution pension plans established through the collective bargaining system.
1-'' In
the beginning of the 1990s, employers and trade unions agreed to extend the coverage to
virtually all workers. Contributions will gradually rise to about 9 percent of gross wages. The
collective savings schemes are legally independent of the company whose employees are
covered, and the savings belong to the individual.
To promote further individual provision for retirement income there is a lax deduction for
savings in private pension plans. However, a tax of 40 percent is levied when these savings are
withdrawn. Despite this fact, individual pension plans are a popular form of saving. As a result,
the state's tax claim on current pension assets amounts to 40 percent of GDP and is expected
to rise to about 80 percent of GDP by 2030 (Barnes 1997).
With a major part of the pension system organized in fully-funded defined contribution
schemes, the threat of an aging population is less pronounced in Denmark compared to other
countries. Recent reforms have been primarily concerned with extending the coverage of
1
4 In 1995, the contribution for a full time worker was DKR 2 332 a year, or about over 1 percent of
an ordinary annual wage income (Barnes 1995).
'- There are still some central government civil service pension schemes working on a pay-as-you-go
basis but they are being discontinued.20
occupational pension schemes. Discussion about a reform of the tax-financed basic pension
involves particularly the question of introducing an income test (Gamillscheg 1997).
2.6 Finland
The Finnish public pension system consists of two pillars (OECD 1997e: 67ff.). One is a basic
pension (national pension) which is comparatively low (and supplemented from general tax
revenues in the event of no other income), the other is a compulsory employment scheme
granting earnings related benefits. The basic pension scheme is nationally administered and
financed by contributions on a pay-as-you-go basis; while the employment scheme is managed
by over sixty private pension institutions. The employment scheme is also financed by
contributions, but it is partially funded: financial assets cover roughly one-third of the present
pension obligations (Noord 1997). The national pension tends to fall as the occupational
pension increases. Except for low-wage earners, the combination of both replaces a maximum
of 60 percent of pensionable income. The statutory retirement age is 65 years, but average
retirement age is only 58 due to disability or early retirement schemes. Due to the generous
benefit levels and a virtually universal coverage of the population by the public pension system,
the market share of voluntary pension insurance has been very small until recently.
Against the background of a particularly pronounced aging of the population, relatively
generous benefits and a low effective retirement age, combined with a general erosion of the
tax base due to the recession in the early nineties, a relatively far-reaching reform of the system
was implemented in several steps during recent years. Without changes, the pension
expenditure had been estimated to reach nearly 18 percent of GDP by the year 2030 — a level
only exceeded in Italy (OECD 1996b).
The main objective of the pension reform was to promote longer working careers, reduce
benefits, and improve the management of the pension funds, while the basic features of the
system, its two-tier approach, mixture of funding and pay-as-you-go financing, pronounced
redistribution and strong involvement of private insurers in the management of the system, has
been maintained.21
Major reform components have been (OECD 1997e: 76ff.; Noord 1997):
— Discontinuation of preferential treatment of public sector employees (1993).
- Measures to improve the pensions of older workers remaining active relative lo those who
retire early (1994 and 1996).
— Increase in the number of years on which the calculation of pensions is based from the last 4
years to the last 10 years (1996).
— Change in the indexation of earnings related pensions to a weighted average of CP1
(80 percent) and earnings index (20 percent). National (basic) pensions remain indexed to
CPI(1996).
- Decision to gradually abolish the flat-rate component of national pensions by the end of the
decade. National pensions will in the future be fully offset against employment pensions.
- Adjustment of the funding method of the employment pensions (since 1993). Since 1993
also employees contribute to the system. Roughly three fifth of the contributions arc used to
finance current pension expenditure, the remainder enters the account of the pension
institutions. A number of measures aim at raising the efficiency of the financing of the
system.
As a result of the reforms, the rise in contributions necessary to balance the system is now
expected to be contained to roughly 26 percent of earnings from 21.4 percent currently,
compared to an estimated 38 percent under pre-reform rules.
2.7 France
In France, the pension system (OECD 1994a) comprises a large number of pay-as-you-go
schemes (about 120 basic schemes and 400 supplementary ones). The system differentiates
between the private sector and the public sector employees (including some categories of
workers like railway men. miners, EDF-employees etc.). The private sector consists of a two-
level system, the general level and the supplementary level while the public sector pensions are
usually one-level. Retirement age, contribution rates and calculation of benefits may vary22
considerably between different schemes (Kaufmann 1997). The ordinary retirement age,
introduced in 1982, is 60. Funded pension schemes play only a very minor role.
In 1993, a first major effort to reforming the public pension system aimed at the method of
calculation of pensions in the general scheme of the private sector (Darnant 1997). It included
- the increase of the contribution period necessary to receive the full rate pension from 37.5
years to 40 years;
- the increase of the number of years used for calculation of the reference wage from 10 to 25
years;
- the change of indexation from wage growth to CPI;
- the creation of a separate fonds in order to finance non-contributory old-age benefits
resulting from national solidarity.
The effect of the 1993 reform is rather limited. While it improves financial prospects until
2005, it leaves many questions unresolved particularly the sustainability of the public sector
"special schemes". A proposal aimed at reforming public sector pensions had to be withdrawn
in 1995 following strikes in the public sector. Given that demographic developments are
relatively beneficial until 2005 but worsening progressively afterwards, the main problems are
still to be solved.
In 1997, a law passed the National Assembly that allows employers and employees to
contribute to fully-funded private pension schemes to top up their state retirement income. The
levels of payments are voluntary but there is an incentive to contribute up to a certain level.
The aim is to strengthen the role of privately managed capital funded pension schemes.
However, after the change of government, legislation came to a halt and the situation remains
unclear.
A peculiarity of the French situation is that despite the obvious demographic developments and
a worldwide trend of increasing the retirement age there is a strong demand to go into the23
opposite direction and decrease further the retirement age — which already is amongst the
lowest in the world — to 55.
2.8 Germany
The provision of old-age pensions in Germany is dominated by the public system which
provides roughly 85 percent of pensions. Voluntary occupational pension schemes, although
some 50 percent of employees are covered, provide only 5 percent of pensions; around
10 percent comes from life insurance (OECD 1996d). Old-age insurance in the public pension
scheme (Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung, GRV) is compulsory for employees oilier than civil
servants whose pensions are paid out of general tax revenue, and voluntary for (he self-
employed. The system is financed pay-as-you-go by contributions levied on gross wages at the
rate of 20.3 percent (1998). and a transfer out of the Federal budget that currently covers
about one fourth of pension outlays. The statutory retirement age is 65, but employees can
retire earlier if they have a long contribution record (al the age of 63), if they are handicapped
(at the age of 60), or if they are unemployed prior to retirement (at the age of 60). Women also
can retire at the age of 60 if they fulfill certain eligibility criteria. As a result of these rules,
more than half of the work force retires before the statutory retirement age.
A major adjustment to the system has been made in 1992 in order to cope with the financial
burden of a rising old-age depending ratio (SVR 1991: I42f.). Particularly, the retirement age
for women will be raised gradually to 65 from 2001, and benefits for pensioners retiring early
were reduced.
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6 Most importantly, the adjustment of pensions was changed from indexation to
gross wages to indexation to net wages. Pension benefits are calculated according to a formula
that is designed to replace 70.1 percent of average net wages during a 45-year working career
(67.8 percent in East Germany).
The 1992 pension reform has diminished but not abolished the incentives for early relirement
(Borsch-Supan 1998).24
Despite the reform of 1992, the public pension system's viability remained in doubt due to the
progressive aging of the population. To combat the expected increase in pension expenditure
— from I I.I percent of GDP in 1995 to almost 19 percent of GDP in 2035 (OECD I996d:
711.) — that without other changes would require an increase in the contribution rate from the
current 20.3 percent to nearly 30 percent in 2030, a further reform package was legislated
taking effect in 1999 (VDR 1997). The main feature of the Reform Act 1999 is that the ratio
of pensions to net wages is gradually reduced according to a demographic factor reflecting the
increase of life expectancy of new retirees. Ultimately, a ratio of 64 percent is projected to be
reached in about three decades. Additional measures include a further increase in the effective
retirement age especially for women, unemployed and handicapped people. After 2012, early
retirement will only be possible for workers with at least 35 years of contributions at the age of
62 and at the price of an actuarial fair reduction of the pension.
According to new projections, the contribution rate that is necessary to finance the system at
1999 rules will be 24.4 percent in 2040 (Handelsblatt 1998b) . Thus, the 1999 reform has only
partly succeeded in balancing the finances of the public pension system in the long-term. While
the package has broadly been in the directions outlined by the Council of Economic Advisors
(SVR 1996: 227ff), it has responded to the needs for reform only to a limited extent and it
seems likely that further measures will prove to be necessary already in the near future (SVR
I997:98ff). However, proposals for further reforms which include an increase of the
retirement age to 70 years or an indexation of pensions to consumer prices rather than wages,
are refused at the moment. Also, a shift towards a funded system as discussed in Siebert (1998)
or BSrsch-Supan (1998) is currently opposed in the political arena.
2.9 Italy
The Italian pension system is the most expensive old-age security system in terms of GDP
among OECD-countries and has displayed a rapid expansion over the last 30 years. Although
the average pension benefit relative to per capita income is broadly in line with other EU-
countries, there is a disproportionate number of pensions relative to population. This, in turn,
reflects the relatively high proportion of persons over 60, the use of pensions as a substitute for25
passive income support to unemployed, and favorable access to early retirement through
seniority pensions (until recently workers could retire after 35 years of work irrespective of
age; in the public sector even earlier). Institutionally, the Italian pension system is extremely
fragmented, administered by funds differentiated for professional categories (Klammer 1997).
This translates into significant inequalities across groups, particularly wilh more favorable
treatment for public sector employees and the self-employed.
In the early nineties, a number of minor reforms were undertaken; the most important probably
the suspension of the link between nominal wage growth and pension benefits (1992). In
August 1995, however, a major reform package passed Parliament (Dini reform). It provided
(OECD 1996: 82ff.; Reynaud and Hege 1996);
- a shift from an earnings-based system to a contribution-based system, wilh contributions
over a life-time period capitalized on the basis of nominal GDP growth;
- a flexible retirement age (57-65 years), with a link between benefits and residual life
expectancy at retirement age;
- a phased increase from 35 to 40 years of contributions required for a seniority pension;
- a ceiling on the pensionable income;
- fiscal incentives for stimulating the growth of private pension funds.
As to the implementation of this major institutional reform, there is a transition period in which
the old system and the new system co-exist. New entrants into the labor market fall under the
new system, and workers with more than 18 years of contributions remain in the old one. To
the intermediate group applies a weighted average of the old and the new formulas.
Although the 1995 reform represents an important improvement towards a more uniform and
financially vaniable system, there still remains a significant shortfall between benefits and
contributions. Moreover, the worsening of the situation over the coming 30 years is mitigated
only to a limited extent. This is partly due to the long transition period; and the retirement age
remains among the lowest in the OECD.26
2.10 Japan
The Japanese pension system (OECD 1997d: I21ff.) consists of a major pillar of funded
occupational pension schemes; 90 percent of private enterprises provide some form of
occupational benefits at retirement, be it in form of a lump sum payment or in form of
pensions. The public pension system is pay-as-you-go financed although the system has been
held in surplus over an extended period of time which resulted in the accumulation of assets
that amount to some 30 percent of GDP. It consists of two tiers. The first is a flat rate system,
which covers, in principle, all residents between the ages of 20 and 60 (National Pension).
Benefits are proportional to the number of years of contributions (minimum 25 years,
maximum 40 years). In the second tier, contributions and pensions are related to earnings
(Employees Pension). It is possible to contract out into certain occupational pension plans.
Pensions are indexed to net wages. The statutory retirement age is 60 years.
Against the background of the extremely rapid aging of the Japanese population, a massive
deterioration of the fiscal balance of the public pension system (or a drastic increase of
contribution rates lo around 35 percent from 17 percent today, respectively) was to be
expected. As a reaction to the deteriorating prospects of the system, the pension system was
revised in 1994 (Kihara 1998; Takayama 1995).
- The retirement age at which the full amount of the Pension is payable will be raised from 60
to 65 over the period 2001 to 2013 for men and over the period 2006 to 2018 for women.
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- The indexation was changed from gross wages to net wages.
- A one percent special contribution rate was applied to the semi-annually bonus payments
which had not been subject to contributions before.
- The increase in the contribution rate which is scheduled to take place every five years was
increased from 2.2 percentage points to 2.5 percentage points.
- Various measures aimed at promoting a delayed retirement were introduced.
1
7 For details nf the rules concerning retirement age see Takayama (1995: 52ff.)27
As a result of this measures it was expected that the contribution rate from the year 2025
onwards could be lowered from 35 percent to 30 percent. However, a revision in underlying
assumptions about birth rates and life expectancy resulted in a revised estimate of the
contribution rate that is necessary to balance the system in the long-term that is very close to
the number of 35 percent estimated before the reform (Kihara 1998).
Despite this bleak outlook for the public pension system a discussion on a full-fledged reform
of the system has barely started in the political arena.
2.11 Netherlands
The Dutch pension system consists of a pay-as-you-go financed public pension scheme that
secures a universal basic pension, an extremely well developed occupational pension sector,
and, in addition, voluntary retirement savings. The public old-age pension (Algemeene
Onderdomswet, AOW) is part of a broader social security scheme that also insures against
nursing care and disability. It pays a flat-rate pension benefit to those who have reached the
age of 65 which is set at 70 percent (100 percent for a married couple) of the statutory
minimum wage. The full rate is contingent on 40 years of contribution. The benefit is reduced
by 2 percent for each full year a person was not insured (Bedee et al. 1995: 268). The AOW
pension benefits amounted to 5.5 percent of GDP in 1996 (Hetzel 1997), and they are financed
pay-as-you-go by contributions that are levied on the first income bracket of the tax code at
the rate of 15.4 percent (1997).
The second pillar is funded occupational pension schemes that have developed over a long
period, and, probably partly as a consequence of the fact that the replacement rate under the
public pension scheme falls sharply with increasing income, covers virtually the entire labor
force (83 percent). This is highly unusual, since provision is voluntary. In most countries where
provision is voluntary, coverage of occupational pension schemes tends to peak at around
50 percent (Davis 1996). Most pension plans are of the defined benefit type, usually designed
to replace 70 percent of final salary at the age of 65 together with the public pension, and 9028
percent of pensioners receive inflation protection.
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8 To increase labor mobility, there is a kind
of clearing house implemented that makes transfers between defined benefit plans straight-
forward. The occupational pension funds have accumulated a huge amount of assets
representing nearly 100 percent of GDP. Additional individual retirement saving is of relatively
little importance, although there are quite significant tax incentives.
In the recent discussions on reforming social security, the main focus in the Netherlands has
been on cutting down on expenditures for disability insurance which due to extremely generous
rules had virtually exploded during the 1980s (OECD 1991) with the result that 15 percent of
the labor force received disability benefits at the beginning of the 1990s (NZZ 1993). In 1993.
disability benefits were reduced and eligibility criteria tightened.
With respect to old-age pensions, there have only been minor changes recently.
Notwithstanding, contribution rates to the public scheme are planned to be held at around
15 percent. The government counts on an improved macroeconomic performance in general
and an increase of the labor force participation ratio, which is extremely low by international
standards, in particular in order to finance the rising pension expenditure that is expected due
to the aging of the population. Also, the benefits level of the basic pension may be gradually
lowered relative to the incomes of the active generations because statutory minimum wages are
expected to lag behind average incomes: Any resulting deficit in the public pension scheme is
planned to be covered by tax revenues. As to the occupational pension schemes, it is envisaged
to calculate the benefits so that they replace 70 percent of average incomes over the whole
career rather than 70 percent of the last earned wage.
2.12 New Zealand
In New Zealand, public pensions are flat-rate benefits which are not means-tested and paid
from general tax revenues. The system works under the label "New Zealand Superannuation".
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8 This is also unusual. In most countries with defined benefit plans, inflation protection is incomplete
or partial, and, as a result, pensions often fall sharply in real terms over time (Davis 1996: 2).29
Since 1994, benefits are differentiated according to household and marital status (NZZ 1994).
In order to raise revenues in the process of fiscal consolidation, a surtax of 20 percent had been
introduced in 1985 on additional retirement income that exceeds a certain limit. In 1992, the
surtax rate was increased to 25 percent, and the limit was nearly halved which aggravated the
detrimental incentive effects implied by this rule. The tax surcharge has been removed in 1997.
From 1990 to 1993, the benefits which are normally adjusted for inflation remained nominally
unchanged with the result of a real decrease in the benefits level.
Despite a currently relatively low level of benefits (public pension benefits in 1994 amounted to
5 percent of GDP in 1997, well below OECD-average), the rapid aging of population will put
a considerable strain on the public finances. As one reaction, a gradual increase in the statutory
retirement age, from 60 to 65 years, in the years 1992 to 2001 has been legislated.
In 1997, a major reform proposal was voted down by an overwhelming majority of
92.4 percent of the voters (Hall 1997). The reform essentially planned to replace the state
pension with a compulsory private insurance scheme in which 8 percent of taxable income
would have been set aside in individual long-term savings accounts a target sum (of
120 000 NZ$) was reached in order to buy an annuity on retirement. The government would
have supplemented the amount where the target would not have been met, but there would
have been neither government guarantees nor indexation. The result would have been a
decrease in government pension outlays to 2 percent of GDP in the long run. However, with
the old system remaining in place now an increase to 12 percent of GDP is still to be expected
(The Economist 1997).
2.13 Spain
The public pension system in Spain is part of a more general social security scheme that also
includes support for survivors and disabled, health care, and social services. Contributions
amount to 28.3 percent of wages of which only 4.7 percent are paid by employees. The share
of contributions that goes to old-age pensions is not published separately. The system is
extremely generous (OECD 1996a: 87f.), it delivers the highest income replacement ratio in30
the EU after Greece (nearly 100 percent after contributions and taxes). Pensions are indexed to
consumer prices.
Fiscal imbalances have led to subsequent reforms that partially rectified the problems for a
limited period of time (OECD 1997c: 70ff.). In the second half of the eighties, benefit criteria
where tightened with an increase in the minimum contribution period from 10 to 15 years, and
pensions began to be assessed on the last eight rather than the last two years' earnings. Since
1988, old-age pensions in addition to the public pension system, can be obtained through
participation in private pension funds which is promoted by the tax code. Because they have
been introduced only recently, pension funds are still relatively spare although they are growing
rapidly (Stapf 1996; OECD 1996a: 79ff.). The volume of assets amount to approximately
5 percent of GDP.
In 1995, a concept for reform known as the Toledo-pact envisaged only minor changes (Engler
1997), including an institutional separation of the different branches of social security, an
increase in the number of years on which the calculation of pensions is based from 8 to 15, and
a change in the pattern of the accrual rate over the time of contribution which is a (minor) step
towards a more actuarially fairness and reduces incentives to retire early. Another important
change is that financing of non-contributory pensions is no longer to be made from
contributions but from general tax revenues by the year 2000. Any resulting surplus in the




The Swedish public pension system consists of two pillars, a flat rate basic pension and an
income-related supplementary pension (ATP). The system works primarily on a pay-as-you-go
basis although there have been surpluses accumulated in the past amounting to some
35 percent of GDP (1994). Discussion about reform of the system is old. In 1994, a major
1
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reform proposal was principally agreed upon albeit the specific details of the report had not
been decided at that time, and it was only at the beginning of this year when government and
opposition parties agreed upon the introduction of the new system (Handelsblatt 1998; FAZ
1998). The dominant feature of the 1994 proposal was to improve actuarial fairness (only
25 percent of the contribution can be regarded as an (actuarial) insurance premium under the
old system). The new system is to be phased in over a period of 20 to 25 years. Its main
features are:
- The flat rate basic pension is gradually clawed back as the earnings-related pension exceeds
a certain threshold.
- Earnings-related pensions are based on life-time income rather than the best 15 years as in
the old system.
- Pensions are indexed to inflation with the indexing factor reduced when real GDP growth is
under a certain norm (1,6 percent) and increased when growth exceeds that norm.
- The official retirement age remains 65 but earlier retirement from the age of 61 onwards and
later retirement (no upper limit) is possible with an actuarial adjustment of the pension.
- Pensions will be linked to life expectancy at retirement.
- Strengthening of the funded element of the system. 2.5 percentage points of the
contribution rate which at 18.5 percent of wages will be put into individual accounts to be
managed upon the guidelines of the contributor.
- Contributions which used to be paid by employers only (since 1995 employees contributed
at a rate of 1 percent) are shared equally between employers and employees in the new
system. The extra-burden on workers is compensated by income tax reductions.32
2.15 Switzerland
In Switzerland, the three-pillar system of old-age income provision has a long tradition. The
system consists of a government-run old-age insurance (AHV) which is financed pay-as-you-
go
211, obligatory occupational pension schemes on a funded basis, and voluntary savings
promoted by preferential tax treatment.
The public pension AHV is financed by contributions by every person over 18 years at a rate of
4.2 percent of every earned income. Contributions are paid by employees and employers at an
equal share. Since 1998, also spouses who are not in the labor force have to contribute and are
from the year 2005 onwards entitled to a pension at the age of 64. There is also a contribution
from the Federal budget amounting to around 20 percent of expenditures (Rechsteiner
1996: 376).
A minimum contribution is set at FR 390 per year, an upper limit does not exist. By contrast,
for the resulting benefits there is an upper limit at FR 1 990 (1997) for a single and FR 2 985
for couples. The minimum pension is FR 995 and FR 1 493, respectively (Ahfeldt 1997).
Pensions are adjusted according to the average of a wage index and the consumer price index,
and the statutory retirement age is 65 for men and, since recently, also for women (Berger
1997).
As the public pension system is designed to deliver only a floor to retirement income, the
second pillar has been made compulsory after a referendum in 1985. It requires employers to
insure their employees with a pension scheme and pay at least half of the contributions which
are 10 percent of the wage bill (Brestel 1998). While occupational pensions before the
introduction of the obligatory second pillar often were lost when the employer was changed,
the contributions are now paid into personal accounts that belong to the individual worker.
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(Giinlhardl 1997).33
The funds collected in the second pillar pension schemes amounted to roughly 90 percent of
GDP in 1995 and are increasing rapidly.
Due to the huge funded part of the old-age pension system, the problems with the aging of the
population are limited compared to other OECD-countries. However, the AHV which is pay-
as-you-go financed will progressively run into a deficit and needs additional financing in the
medium to long-term (NZZ 1998) in the absence of other reform measures.
2.16 United Kingdom
The public pension system in the United Kingdom originates from the Beveridge-idea of a
comprehensive "National Insurance" (providing a basic flat rate benefit in the case of
unemployment, sickness, and disability, and an old-age pension) that is financed by flat rate
contributions (Disney and Johnson 1998). Additional private insurance would be left to the
individual's choice. In the decades after the war, a system developed in which flat rale benefits
were combined with earnings-related contributions which eventually led to the demand for an
earnings-related component of pensions. As a result, in 1978 the State Earnings Related
Pension Scheme (SERPS) was introduced. An essential feature of the arrangement was the
contracting out principle, which allows to opt for contributing to an approved company
pension scheme in exchange for a reduction in the contribution rate to the National Insurance.
This is to be seen against the background that at the time of introduction of SERPS already
half of the work force was covered by occupational pension schemes.
Further reforms, mainly the return to consumer price indexation (1979) and downgrading of
SERPS benefits (1986) made the public pension scheme less attractive (and much less
expensive for the budget in the long run). In addition, the range of pension plans entitled to
obtain the contracted-out status was expanded to include defined contribution plans in order to
make occupational pension schemes more attractive, especially for smaller companies. Also,
the possibility of opting for individual retirement savings accounts (Personal Pensions) was
introduced. As a result, since the mid-80s the number of persons remaining in SERPS declined
further to around one quarter of the work force.34
The problem for the government with this development has been that contributions to the pay-
as-you-go system were reduced through increased contracting-out. An estimated 2 percentage
points of the increase in National Insurance contributions that was necessary to finance the
current expenditure on SERPS-pensions can be attributed to this factor (Disney and Johnson
1998)
21.
In 1995, a reform bill was primarily designed to tighten up the regulation of occupational
pension plans, but contained some notable components relevant to the future prospects of the
public pension system. First, the pensionable age of women will be raised gradually to equal
that of men at 65, between the years 2010 and 2020. Second, a technical reform of the
calculation of SERPS benefits and the abolition of a guaranteed minimum pension will produce
a large saving in future government expenditure.
As a result of a relatively small market share of pay-as-you-go financed public pensions
consisting of basic pensions which are relatively low (approximately 15 percent of average
earnings for an individual; Dilnot et al. 1994) and a small and declining portion of earnings-
related pensions, combined with a compared to other countries relatively benign demographic
structure, the problems of the public pension schemes in the United Kingdom are projected to
be minor. Provided that the basic state pension continues to be indexed to prices, no increase in
contribution rates will be necessary (OECD 1994b).
2.17 United States
In the United States, the central part of the public pension system is the Old Age, Survivors
and Disability insurance (OASDI), which is known as Social Security. This is a defined benefit
pension scheme financed by a pay-roll tax of currently 12.4 percent on a pay-as-you-go basis.
The system covers in principle every person in employment (except part of the public sector
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and household servants with income of less than $1 000 per year). There is an upper limit to
average monthly earnings subject to the pay-roll tax. Benefits are calculated on the basis of the
best 35 years of the career and are indexed to the consumer price index. The benefits formula
contains a quite significant element of redistribution, so that low-income wage earners get a
retirement return on their social security taxes at more than triple the rate of high-income wage
earners (Kuttner 1998).
The OASDI is required to be financially balanced over a period of 75 years. In 1983. after a
commission chaired by Alan Greenspan had testified a severe long-term financial
disequilibrium, a reform was carried out that included a slight cut in the inflation adjustment
formula, an increase in the taxable income base, a gradual raising of the statutory retirement
age by two years to 67 beginning in the year 2000, and the taxation of social security benefits
to retirees with abundant other incomes. Also incentives to retire early were reduced and
obstacles to working longer years removed (Lumsdaine and Wise 1994: 2Iff.). In addition, the
Social Security tax rate was gradually raised from 10.8 to 12.4 percent.
In combination, these measures not only restored the short-term solvency of the system but
generated a surplus of contributions and return on assets of the system over pension outlays.
As a result, assets are accumulated in a Trust fund. The volume of these is expected to peak in
the year 2021 (Kijakazi, Primus, Greenstein 1998)
22. From that year on, expenditures on
Social Security benefits will surpass revenues so that the trust fund assets will progressively be
run down until from the year 2032 onwards, according to recent projections, the system
becomes (partially) insolvent. In contrast to the assessment of the Greenspan commission, the
1983 reforms have apparently not been sufficient to stabilize the system. There is still a




2 The amount of assets at the peak is estimated at around $ 3 Trillion, about 35 percent of GDP in
1998 (The Economist 1998a).
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3 The unfunded obligations of OASDI are an estimated $ 9 Trillion, 106 percent of this year's GDP
(Mitchell 1998). The main reason for Ihe revision has been unanticipated weak wage growth in the
decade between 1983 and 1993. It has to be noted that the calculations are now based on36
As a reaction to the perception of a high level of unfunded liabilities implicit in current rules, an
Advisory Council was formed to evaluate the situation and possible reforms of the system. The
committee came up with a number of reform proposals (Gramlich 1998), ranging from minor
changes in benefit schedules and contribution rates (the financial balance would be restored
mainly through improved investment of social security funds) to a wide-sweeping reform in
which the present defined benefit system would be replaced with a large-scale defined
contributions scheme, similar to the Chilean model.
Very recently, the proposal of a bipartisan working group has entered the discussion that
essentially plans to divert two percentage points of the current 12.4 percent payroll tax into
individual savings accounts (The Economist 1998b). To secure the system's solvency despite
the reduced contributions that finance current pension expenditure, the retirement age would
rise to 70 by 2029, and the early retirement age (at which a reduced pension can be received)
would rise to 65 by 2017. In addition, some of the expected surplus in the Federal Budget
could be used to finance the transition. As a result, the transition to a system comprising a
significant funded pillar could be managed without a (Social Security-)tax rise.
While a major overhaul of the public pension scheme has not been decided yet, the
administration has progressively increased incentives to save for retirement on voluntary basis
(Eckhardt 1998). Contributions to individual retirement accounts are tax deductible up to a
certain limit (currently $2 000 per year). So called 401(k)-accounts (named after the respective
paragraph in the income tax code) are tax favored savings where the amount of individual
savings is matched by an employer contribution. Occupational pension schemes are relevant
mainly for employers of major companies. The majority is of the defined-benefit type although
defined contribution plans gained popularity in recent years, after a number of pension plans'
solvency came into doubt in the early 1990s (The Economist 1993).
assumptions about real growth in the economy that are extremely moderate (1.6 percent annual real
GDP growth, compared to about 3 percent over the last 75 years).37
3. Other Parts of the World
3.1 Central and Eastern Europe
The formerly centrally planned economies in Central and Eastern Europe inherited a
comprehensive unfunded pension system. Pension expenditure in percent of GDP has been in
many countries quite high and has increased rapidly during the early years of transition, partly
due to the fact that the necessary reduction of the work force often took place through early
retirement. High pension expenditure is reflected in high rates of social security contributions,
often at around 50 percent of gross wages (Holzmann 1997).
2
4
The typical old-age pension scheme that prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe is
characterized by relatively low statutory retirement ages (Cichon et al. 1997: 160, generally
men were entitled to receive a pension at the age of 60, women at the age of 55 (with the
exception of Poland where retirement ages were 65 and 60, respectively). Typical qualifying
conditions were 25 years of contributions for men and 20 for women. Benefit formulas
normally used a fixed percentage of reference income for the required minimum number of
years, plus an increment for additional years of contributions. Actual replacement rates were
usually relatively high and could reach 75 percent of the reference income for persons with 40
years of contributions and 50 percent for as little as 20 years of contributions. In the early
years of transition, however, due to incomplete indexation, the real value of pensions declined
markedly in a number of countries, with the result that despite high pension expenditure in
terms of GDP a significant share of pensioners receive income below the official poverty lines
(Holzmann 1997: 16).
Initial reform considerations were geared towards a financial redressing of the unfunded
schemes and an elimination of the main distortions with the traditional measures. These include
an increase in the statutory retirement age, an extension of the reference period on which
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benefits are calculated, a reduction in the replacement rate, higher deaccrual factors for early
retirement, price instead of wage indexation, elimination of group privileges, consistent tax
treatment of contributions and benefits.
However, none of the reform countries succeeded in the implementation of a consistent reform
package along these lines that would have made it possible to put the public pension scheme on
a sound financial footing for the short and medium term. In most countries, only minor
adjustments or discretionary changes have been made.
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While progress in reforming the pay-as-you-go financed pension systems along traditional lines
proved to be difficult against the background that such measures necessarily mean a cutback
on acquired rights for important segments of the population, the focus increasingly shifted
towards possibilities of a major systemic reform. Particularly, a move towards funded schemes
by means of the introduction of a multi-pillar pension system as proposed by the World Bank
(1994) gained popularity. In a number of countries, pension reform plans that include a
(partial) shift to funded pension schemes have been proposed and in an increasing number of
them, among them Estonia, Latvia, Hungary and Poland, the implementation is prepared in
earnest or has even already started. The preparation of the reform plans has been assisted by
the World Bank (Eesti Pank 1998) and financial assistance in the implementation is also
granted (The Financial Times 1998). In the remainder of this section, recent developments in
the three major countries of the region are described in more detail.
— Czech Republic
The main pillar of the Czech pension system is a public pay-as-you-go financed system
comprising a flat-rate and an earnings-related component (since 1996). In order to provide
additional retirement income, the establishment of private pension funds, which are restricted in
For a country by country overview of pension reforms undertaken or under discussion see Cichon et
al. 1997: 22ff.39
their investment decisions, has been made possible as early as 1993. Participation in private
insurance schemes is voluntary but supported by state contributions. Although the public
pension expenditure is relatively modest at 9 percent of GDP (OECD 1996e) compared to
other Central European countries, the rate of contribution to the public pension scheme at
26 percent is still high by international standards and expected to increase due to a
deteriorating depending ratio. As a reaction, it was decided in a 1995 reform bill to gradually
increase the retirement age from 60 years to 62 years for men and from 53 - 57 years
(according to the number of children) for women to 57 - 61 years by the year 2006. Additional
measures include a gradual increase in the number of active years on which the calculation of
benefits is based from 10 to 30 years, the introduction of more formal indexing rules-
6 and,
maybe most importantly, strengthening the link between contributions and benefits. The
pension reform debate has begun again recently, focusing on the introduction of an additional




In Hungary, the National Pension Fund was established in 1991 paying pensions on a pay-as-
you-go basis. A second voluntary tier was introduced in 1995 based on mutual funds. The
aging of the population, declining employment rates and a large and rising share of the work
force on early retirement and disability pensions has inclined the government to make a number
of reforms in recent years. These reforms have included a broadening of the contributions base,
and the raising of the statutory retirement age from 60 and 55 for men and women.
2
6 Contributions are indexed to average wages and benefits to CPI and wages. The adjustment of
pensions to developments in prices has still a significant discretionary element. According to the
reform bill, pensions are to be adjusted when consumer price increases have accumulated to
5 percent, and increases in wages are to be taken into account. In order to generate savings in
government expenditures in face of the deteriorating economic environment, it was, however,
decided to raise pensions not before a rise in prices of at least 10 percent occurred (Lodahl and
Schrooten 1998: 109).
2
7 This section draws on OECD (I997f: 136ff.) and Cichon et al. (1997: 23).40
respectively, to a uniform 62 years by 2009. In its latest reform package, there is also a change
of indexation from a wage-based system to a combination of wages and consumer prices
("Swiss index").
The above changes in the pay-as-you-go scheme are expected to lead to a significant surplus in
Ihe finances of the system at today's contribution rate (30 percent) in the short to medium-term
(although a fall into deficit after 2030 is still to be expected). These surpluses are planned to be
used to help finance the transition to a more equitable and financially sustainable three-tier
system which was started at the beginning of 1998. The new system comprises a scaled-down
pay-as-you-go scheme, complemented by a compulsory, privately managed, fully-funded
second tier and a voluntary fully-funded third tier.
In the new system, the pay-as-you-go tier will be defined benefit and earnings related providing
a replacement rate of 40 percent after 35 years of contributions. It will be financed by three-
quarters of the total present contributions. The remaining quarter will be paid into the
individual retirement savings scheme. The new system will be compulsory for new entrants into
the labor market, while existing employees under 47 years of age can opt for either the new
multi-tier system or the modified old pension system.
— Poland
The Polish public pension system underwent a major revision in 1993, when the system was
split up into two tiers (Heinrich et al. 1996: 87ff.). One tier provides a flat rate basic pension
amounting to 24 percent of the average gross wage, the second tier pays a benefit related to
the individual's years of contribution and her earnings in the five best of the fourteen years
preceding retirement. Pension benefits are taxable. Together with the reform of the institutional
characteristics of the pension system, the benefits level was raised in order to compensate for
incomplete indexation in the preceding years, and a regular adjustment to changes in average
wages was introduced. Currently, public pensions are on average as high as 70 percent of the
average wage. As a result of the combination of a high benefits level and a rising number of41
pensioners
28, public pension expenditure has increased strongly and has reached 16 percent of
GDP compared to 10 percent on average in the OECD-countries.
The high financial burden of the existing pension system and the mounting doubts about its
viability in the future led to persistent demand for further reform. Recently, a rather wide-
sweeping reform
2
9 has been legislated and is scheduled to become effective beginning in 1999
(Woycicka 1998). It essentially means to replace the present social security system gradually
by a system consisting of two mandatory pillars: the first financed on a pay-as-you-go but
defined-contribution basis (as has been introduced recently in Latvia), and the second fully
funded and privately managed. In addition, retirement income is to be supplied by voluntary
individual savings. As to the first pillar, benefits are calculated according to past contributions
and the life expectancy at retirement which effectively corrects for early or late retirement. In
light of experience made in Latvia, however, the statutory retirement age will be kept at
present levels. 20 percent of the current social security contributions (9 percent of wages) will
be paid into the second leg of the system comprising individual accounts in privately managed
but regulated pension fonds.
The system will be introduced gradually. Workers aged over 50 remain in the old system.
Workers younger than 30 will contribute to the new system, and workers between 30 and 50
can contribute to the second leg of the new system on a voluntary basis. A deficit in the current
pension scheme that results from the effective 20 percent reduction in contributions to the pay-
as-you-go system for younger workers is planned to be financed from the general budget using
receipts from privatization.
2
8 While the statutory retirement age at 65 and 60 for men and women, respectively, is relatively high
compared to other Central European countries, the actual retirement age is much lower due to early
retirement.
2
9 For a detailed description of the reform and its rationale see World Bank (1997a: 72ff.) and Loboda
and Szalkiewicz-Zaradzka (1998).42
3.2 East Asia
East Asia is the most rapidly aging and most rapidly growing region (James 1997: 362). In
many countries the aging of population combines with the erosion of the extended family, and
governments will have to act quickly to these challenges. Currently, public pension schemes
based on the principle of pay-as-you-go financing are virtually non-existent. While in some
countries, like Singapore and Malaysia, retirement saving is mandatory and in the Philippines,
there is a relatively well-developed two-pillar pension system (Asher 1998), most countries,
including China and Indonesia, still have to build up formal universal pension schemes. Recent
steps have been dominated by efforts to extend the coverage of occupational pension schemes
on a defmed-contribution basis (Piazolo 1998). A special case which deserves particular
attention is China, where the problems of the pension system interlink with the challenge of
structural adjustments in the state-enterprise sector (World Bank 1997b).
3.3 Latin America
Public pension systems have in Latin America traditionally been financed pay-as-you-go. These
systems, however, have fared particularly bad in an international comparison. They did not
deliver what they had promised, and although there had been cuts in benefits and a rising rate
of contributions, financial disequilibrium increased. The Argentine public pension system, for
example, was virtually bankrupt in 1991 (Queisser 1998).
In view of the deteriorating performance of the pay-as-you-go schemes and the prospects for a
further worsening of the situation, an increasing number of Latin American governments
decided to implement a major systemic reform, partly along the lines of the Chilean model,
partly more in accordance with the World Bank's three-pillar approach. However, the
introduction of a significant element of pre-funding of pensions was at the heart of the reforms
in any case.
The Chilean reform of 1981 is well known and well documented (e.g. Edwards 1998; Vittas
1995). Essentially, the reform meant to privatize old-age pensions. The former pay-as-you-go43
system which was inefficient, distributively unjust and basically insolvent was replaced with a
mandatory individual capitalization, fully funded, privately managed system that delivers
pensions on a defined contribution basis. The government guarantees a minimum pension that
is defined relative to the average yield of the pension funds. Pension claims that had been
accumulated under the old system were recognized by issuance of government bonds.
While there have been some weaknesses identified, including a lack of coverage, problems of
moral hazard among low wage workers, and high administration costs, the Chilean reform has
been widely judged as a success. This may have contributed to a spreading of the idea of
reforming public pension systems towards more funding to an increasing number of Latin
American countries. Major reforms have been undertaken or are underway in Argentina
(1994), Bolivia (underway), Colombia (1994), Mexico (1992, 1995), and Uruguay (1996).
Other countries, including Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay,
are engaged in serious discussions. In all cases the reform involved setting up a fully-funded
saving plan, continuing to pay the pensions of retirees and of workers who do not switch, and
issuing bonds recognizing the accrued entitlements of workers who do switch (James 1997:
363). However, the reforms in the individual countries differ significantly in a number of key
respects.
3
0 Differences can be identified concerning the character of the funded pillar
(mandatory or voluntary), the mode of financing of the new system, the size of a remaining
pay-as-you-go pillar and the existence and level of a guaranteed minimum pension, the size and
finance of the transition obligation, and the details of the regulatory framework. The variations
in recent approaches to old-age pension reform in Latin America will give an opportunity to
gain further empirical evidence on the shape of a well-designed pension reform.
3
0 For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of the reforms and of problems associated with
the various pension systems see Aiyer(l997) and Mitchell and Barreto (1997).44
4. Concluding Remarks
There is a clear tendency to reforms that increase the degree of pre-funding of pension
obligations. A number of countries has proceeded significantly along that route, be it through
stronger funding in the public pension schemes (Canada, Finland, Sweden, US), be it through
strengthening the role of private occupational pensions (Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, UK). These measures that tend to lessen the burden on future generations, have
resulted in a burden today that is somewhat higher than without such reforms despite the fact
that measures to restrain expenditure were taken also. In some countries, contribution rates are
raised beyond what would be necessary without an increased funding, in other countries
subsidies to the system from general tax revenues are increased. Another set of industrial
countries have confined their reforms mainly to more or less significant adjustments to the
prevailing pay-as-you-go systems, without increasing the funded element (Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy. Japan, New Zealand, Spain). The capacity of the conventional
measures to redress these systems in order to balance their finances in the long-term seems
limited, however:
— An increase in revenues through higher contribution rates or taxes is obviously about to
reach a ceiling in a number of countries due to the associated excess burden of such a policy
and rising international tax competition.
— Lowering of other public expenditure (e.g. education or defense) can only contribute
partially given the scope of the task.
— A marked increase in the retirement age can potentially contribute significantly but is
politically difficult to implement, especially where high unemployment is effectively pressing
actual retirement age into the opposite direction.
— The reduction in the benefit level per retiree through lower pension benefits, lower
indexation, higher taxing or enhanced means-testing has been applied in recent reforms in
various countries but these measures can only mitigate some of the problems and are unlikely
to put the pension schemes on a sound long-term fiscal footing.45
Because an early move to increased funding can reduce significantly the burden that is to be
ultimately borne when the strong cohorts will retire, pension reform in that direction should be
part of a strategy to cope with the problems of an aging population. Particularly, the majority
of Euroland countries have until now been lagging behind on that route. By increasing the
capacity to finance the transition, further consolidation of the general government finances
(excluding social security) can greatly contribute to the viability of a major switch to funded
pensions. The rectifying of existing pay-as-you-go schemes (raising retirement age, eliminating
rewards for early retirement, downsizing benefits) can be seen as a first necessary step on the
way towards a system comprising a major funded pillar, in order to reduce the uncovered
liabilities and increase the relative attractiveness of a new system. Perhaps the examples of
more radical reforms in some future member countries of the European Union in Central
Europe can stimulate the discussion on more decisive reforms in the Union itself.46
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